Skip to main content

Choosing Not to Choose


Today Cass Sunstein (in the picture above) talks about his book Choosing Not to Choose: Understanding the Value of Choice. Cass R. Sunstein is currently the Robert Walmsley University Professor at Harvard. He is now working on group decision-making and various projects on the idea of liberty.

Choice is often an extraordinary benefit, but it can also be an immense burden. Time and attention are precious commodities, and we cannot focus on everything, even when our interests and our values are at stake. If we had to make choices about everything that affects us, we would be overwhelmed. We exercise our freedom, and we improve our welfare, by choosing not to choose. That choice opens up time and space for us, enabling us to focus on our real concerns. Establishing these claims, and identifying their limitations, are the purposes of this book.

When you use a GPS, you are effectively asking it to choose a route for you; it provides a default route, which you can ignore if you like. Or people may make a delegation implicitly; everyone may know that they don’t want to make certain choices. We often think, or even say (sometimes with enthusiasm, sometimes with irritation), “You decide.” In some situations, that particular choice makes us a lot better off.



When websites ask you to check a box saying, “don’t ask me again,” a lot of people are happy to check that box. If public officials, or doctors, ask you to fill out numerous and duplicative forms, indicating choices of multiple kinds, you may get immensely frustrated, and wish that at least some of those choices had been made for you. And if a cab driver insists on asking you to choose which route you want to take in an unfamiliar city, you might wish he hadn’t asked, and just selected the route that he deems best.

There is a related point. Our lives are actually full of things that we have by default, and without necessarily exercising our power to choose. Deciding by default is an omnipresent (and often wonderful) feature of human life. You may have chosen a cell phone, but you didn’t choose all of its features, and it has a lot of default settings, many of which you can change if you wish. If you decide to work for a particular employer, you might well find yourself with a health insurance plan, a retirement plan, and a series of rights and obligations that you did not specifically select; you may be able to change them. Countless decisions are made by default, in the sense that some kind of presumption or default rule is in place, subject to override by those who are affected.

There is a more immediate point, and it is distinctive to our era. The world is now in the midst of a period of extraordinary technological change, in which the nature of default rules, and the relationship between choices and defaults, is very much in flux. More than at any time in human history, it is simple to ask people: What, exactly, do you want? Active choosing is feasible in countless areas, whether the question involves health care, travel preferences, investments, or computer settings. Where people used to have to rely on others, or to defer to some kind of default, they can now decide on their own.

There is a sharply contrasting development, and it is occurring simultaneously. More than at any point in human history, it is feasible to tailor defaults to people’s personal situations. If you are young or old, male or female, tall or small, fat or thin, rich or poor, well-educated or not, a default can be selected for you. Indeed, it is feasible to go much further. If you are John Smith or Mary Williams, a default can be chosen just for you – on the basis of what is known about you, and perhaps even on the basis of a comprehensive understanding, or profile, of your own previous choices. Once you have made a large number of choices, and perhaps once you have made just one or a few, you might find yourself with a series of personalized default rules, covering a lot of your life.

Is the rise of personalized default rules a blessing or a curse? Short answer: Blessing. Is it a utopian or dystopian vision? Short answer: Utopian. But no short answer is sufficient. The goal of this book is to offer a framework with which to answer these questions.

Popular posts from this blog

Delusions in the DSM 5

This post is by Lisa Bortolotti. How has the definition of delusions changed in the DSM 5? Here are some first impressions. In the DSM-IV (Glossary) delusions were defined as follows: Delusion. A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of the person's culture or subculture (e.g., it is not an article of religious faith). When a false belief involves a value judgment, it is regarded as a delusion only when the judgment is so extreme as to defy credibility.

Rationalization: Why your intelligence, vigilance and expertise probably don't protect you

Today's post is by Jonathan Ellis , Associate Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Center for Public Philosophy at the University of California, Santa Cruz, and Eric Schwitzgebel , Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Riverside. This is the first in a two-part contribution on their paper "Rationalization in Moral and Philosophical thought" in Moral Inferences , eds. J. F. Bonnefon and B. Trémolière (Psychology Press, 2017). We’ve all been there. You’re arguing with someone – about politics, or a policy at work, or about whose turn it is to do the dishes – and they keep finding all kinds of self-serving justifications for their view. When one of their arguments is defeated, rather than rethinking their position they just leap to another argument, then maybe another. They’re rationalizing –coming up with convenient defenses for what they want to believe, rather than responding even-handedly to the points you're making. Yo

A co-citation analysis of cross-disciplinarity in the empirically-informed philosophy of mind

Today's post is by  Karen Yan (National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University) on her recent paper (co-authored with Chuan-Ya Liao), " A co-citation analysis of cross-disciplinarity in the empirically-informed philosophy of mind " ( Synthese 2023). Karen Yan What drives us to write this paper is our curiosity about what it means when philosophers of mind claim their works are informed by empirical evidence and how to assess this quality of empirically-informedness. Building on Knobe’s (2015) quantitative metaphilosophical analyses of empirically-informed philosophy of mind (EIPM), we investigated further how empirically-informed philosophers rely on empirical research and what metaphilosophical lessons to draw from our empirical results.  We utilize scientometric tools and categorization analysis to provide an empirically reliable description of EIPM. Our methodological novelty lies in integrating the co-citation analysis tool with the conceptual resources from the philosoph