Skip to main content

PERFECT 2018/2019 (Lisa)

We have got to the last year of project PERFECT. In this brief post I will summarise our latest challenges and achievements, and move on to describe our plans for the year to come which we want to make a year to remember!



Our recent past

Our research has continued to focus on memory and confabulation, according to plan. We have managed to secure publication for several original research articles. I authored papers on confabulation and the optimism bias, and co-authored papers on memory and delusion. Sophie, Michael, and Valeria will report on their own efforts in the next few weeks!

As well as organising and participating in academic conferences and writing articles for specialist journals, we have made a real effort to reach wider audiences. One way in which I have attempted to disseminate our work on cognitions that are imperfect but useful is by writing for Aeon (on dementia and confabulation) and IAI TV (on optimism and the self) and, with Kathy Puddifoot, for the Philosophers Magazine (on memory).

Our hopeful future

There is so much we still want to do and it is not clear that we can do it all in the 12 months we have left, but we will give it a try! We start the academic year with two visitors, Chris Moulin and Krystyna Bielecka, who will certainly help us think outside the box and reflect on interesting issues that are at the core of the project. Chris will be talking to us about deja vu and Krystyna about confabulation.

In October we have planned a little celebration, a book launch, for our forthcoming publication, Delusions in Context, a book for Palgrave Pivot. The electronic version will be open access for you all to enjoy! The contributors Richard Bentall, Rachel Upthegrove, and Phil Corlett are well known to our blog readers and have provided original work on delusions in their chapters, telling us about the importance of thinking about delusion in the context of what we already know about belief. Watch the blog for more information!




In summer 2019 we plan a bigger celebration to coincide with the Arts and Science Festival. We hope to showcase some art that addresses issues central to mental health and our understanding of the world, starting from the beautiful and moving artwork by our ex-team member Magdalena Antrobus, now a successful full-time artist!

In terms of research, I am planning to write about the epistemic responsibility we have when we consume stories that are used as arguments in public debates, with Sophie Stammers and Anneli Jefferson. I am also interested in exploring further the literature on choice blindness with long-term collaborator Ema Sullivan-Bissett, and finally completing work on my Epistemic Innocence monograph. A busy year!

Your contribution

The blog has been and will continue to be a very important part of the project, and a straight-forward way to bring our work at PERFECT out of our offices and seminar rooms and into the world. If you have any feedback or comments on what you have read on the blog, especially about the project but also more widely, please let us know. We would like to know whether the views we argue for ring true to you given your experience or knowledge, and whether you think there are relevant areas of inquiry that we should approach next!

You can leave a comment below or email us.



Popular posts from this blog

Delusions in the DSM 5

This post is by Lisa Bortolotti. How has the definition of delusions changed in the DSM 5? Here are some first impressions. In the DSM-IV (Glossary) delusions were defined as follows: Delusion. A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of the person's culture or subculture (e.g., it is not an article of religious faith). When a false belief involves a value judgment, it is regarded as a delusion only when the judgment is so extreme as to defy credibility.

Rationalization: Why your intelligence, vigilance and expertise probably don't protect you

Today's post is by Jonathan Ellis , Associate Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Center for Public Philosophy at the University of California, Santa Cruz, and Eric Schwitzgebel , Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Riverside. This is the first in a two-part contribution on their paper "Rationalization in Moral and Philosophical thought" in Moral Inferences , eds. J. F. Bonnefon and B. Trémolière (Psychology Press, 2017). We’ve all been there. You’re arguing with someone – about politics, or a policy at work, or about whose turn it is to do the dishes – and they keep finding all kinds of self-serving justifications for their view. When one of their arguments is defeated, rather than rethinking their position they just leap to another argument, then maybe another. They’re rationalizing –coming up with convenient defenses for what they want to believe, rather than responding even-handedly to the points you're making. Yo...

A co-citation analysis of cross-disciplinarity in the empirically-informed philosophy of mind

Today's post is by  Karen Yan (National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University) on her recent paper (co-authored with Chuan-Ya Liao), " A co-citation analysis of cross-disciplinarity in the empirically-informed philosophy of mind " ( Synthese 2023). Karen Yan What drives us to write this paper is our curiosity about what it means when philosophers of mind claim their works are informed by empirical evidence and how to assess this quality of empirically-informedness. Building on Knobe’s (2015) quantitative metaphilosophical analyses of empirically-informed philosophy of mind (EIPM), we investigated further how empirically-informed philosophers rely on empirical research and what metaphilosophical lessons to draw from our empirical results.  We utilize scientometric tools and categorization analysis to provide an empirically reliable description of EIPM. Our methodological novelty lies in integrating the co-citation analysis tool with the conceptual resources from the philosoph...